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Abstract: 
At present, a first round of hospital benchmarking as required by German law on health care 
reform takes place. After extensive discussions between hospitals and insurance companies, 
which are jointly responsible to deliver benchmarking results, a method with some peculiar 
characteristics was chosen. In this paper it is argued that the deficiencies of said method could 
be overcome by using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). The reasons that make DEA an 
advisable tool for policy decisions within the context of relative performance evaluation in the 
health care sector are discussed. 
In order to illustrate the potential of nonparametric frontier estimation for hospital bench-
marking in Germany, a comparison of hospitals, which provide the same basic clinical care, is 
carried out. Controlling for differences in the case mix and for possible heterogeneity of the 
services which hospitals provide, substantial productivity differences can be detected. Beyond 
simply identifying inefficient providers DEA leads to additional insight about the reasons of 
inefficiency and to useful management implications.  1.  Introduction 
Hospital costs are the largest portion of health related expenditures in Germany. In 1994, the 
year for which the data necessary for our analysis are available, outlays for health related 
expenditures amounted to 12.5% of GDP, a third of which were hospital cost.
1 Therefore, cost 
containment in the hospital sector is a key issue in stabilizing health cost at a sustainable 
level. 
This has been recognized by German lawmakers and is reflected in recent reforms of and 
reform proposals for the German health system.
2 A key element of all reforms and proposals 
is to introduce some elements of a market mechanism into the financing system relevant for 
all German hospitals.
3 The planning mechanisms that dominate the health system to date are 
viewed to be one of the causes of steadily rising cost. Hospitals used to be paid a per diem 
plus fees for certain tasks they performed. This rather low powered regulation scheme
4 led to 
prolonged stays of patients in hospitals and redundant provision of tasks.
5 According to a new 
payment scheme which covers the most common diagnoses in the International Classification 
of Diseases (ICD) hospitals are now paid a treatment flat rate to cover variable cost, regard-
less of how long the stay and what efforts are needed to treat any particular referral.
6 
Clearly, a budgeting scheme based only on reported hospital cost (“input budgeting”) has 
nothing to do with performance oriented resource allocation. An apparent solution would be 
to base payments on provided treatments/tasks (“output budgeting”). Such a budget allocation 
mechanism would separate the payments from cost and ensure only efficient providers to be 
able to generate positive profits. But in this case another problem arises because a budget paid 
completely independent from cost (a so called „global budget“) would assume, that at least 
some hospitals have a cost structure that allows gaining a positive profit. Even if this were to 
be the case, in a phase of a generally increasing demand for higher quality medical care or 
more advanced treatment methods an improvement of health care provision in the future 
would be blocked from the start.
7 Only by using performance measures that simultaneously 
integrate input and output variables (i.e., an efficiency measure!) it is possible to overcome 
                                                           
1   See Geil et al. (1997). 
2   The reforms and the key arguments behind various reform strategies are well documented in Arnold and Paf-
frath (1995); Arnold and Paffrath (1996); Arnold and Paffrath (1997). 
3   See Thomae (1995). 
4   See Laffont and Tirole (1993). 
5   The duplication x-rays already taken by the referring physicians in hospitals is one popular example.  
6   For an overview on international systems of hospital financing, including Germany, see Stepan (1997). 
7   See Knieps and Reichelt (1999). these drawbacks. We will come back to this point in the sequel by introducing a method that 
calculates performance as an overall efficiency value. 
It is well known that the question of how to set the appropriate treatment flat rate cannot be 
based on the status quo, i.e., by dividing total cost accrued by number and type of cases 
treated. The appropriate norm figure would have to be calculated on the basis of an efficient, 
„best practiced“ provision of services by the hospital. In Germany, the issue of how to set an 
appropriate fee is dealt with at present in various negotiation panels between individual hospi-
tals and insurers. A negotiation round starts with a hospital reporting on its cost structure from 
which it derives the fees it demands. The insurance company accepts or declines the per diem 
and treatment flat rates calculated by the hospital from its outlays and in the latter case makes 
an offer based on some other, presumably more efficient, hospital’s cost structure, i.e., the 
benchmark or reference hospital. In case the hospital declines the insurer’s offer an arbitration 
panel will settle the case. If the panel fails to negotiate a compromise the hospital or the insur-
ance company may take the matter to court. As of now, insurance companies have not won 
one single case of this type. 
In addition to the fact that the system is hardly workable, i.e., that benchmarks provided by 
the insurers are often not accepted by the hospitals on grounds that reference hospitals cannot 
be compared to their own institutions, there is no guarantee when starting out at the status quo 
established under the planned system appropriate fees will be found through negotiations 
based on benchmarking and that in the long run maximum savings will be realized. 
Efforts to enhance service, quality and efficiency have over the past decade gained momen-
tum on all levels of government - and performance measurement is being promoted not only 
in the health care sector but also in the entire public administration sector. Assessing the effi-
ciency impact of government programs (e.g. health care reform) and service providers (e.g. 
hospitals) is thus being studied with increasing intensity. Performance measurement is the key 
element within a new system of controlling of public organizations, which is well known 
under the term New Public Management.
8  
Most government agencies, as well as those private for-profit and nonprofit organizations 
delivering government services under grants and contracts, will become more and more 
involved in performance evaluation. Nevertheless, adopting productivity evaluation is still the 
exception rather than the norm in German government and, hence, there is a great potential to 
                                                           
8   See Klingebiel (1997). improve performance, accountability, and responsiveness by implementing systematic per-
formance evaluation and by integrating performance information into regular policy and 
public management processes. 
There are mainly two reasons for the impetus to implement performance measurement sys-
tems. First, performance dependent measures of budget allocation, granting, and contracting 
can be established, which will allow for a competition for financial resources. A second rea-
son is an alignment concerning quality and efficiency of the provision of similar or homoge-
neous services by improving the accomplishment of the several providers. Analyzing the 
operations of best performing „reference providers“ offers insights that assist policymakers 
and policy evaluators to identify strategies on how to effect increases in performance. 
In the health care sector public performance measurement was established in German federal 
law with § 3 and § 5 of the Hospital Cost Reimbursement Act (Bundespflegesatzverordnung - 
BPflV) of 1995.
9 But the political impact and economic effects of performance measurement 
will depend heavily on the choice of the evaluation method. With the wrong approach even a 
good end will lead to bad results. Or put in another way: Policymakers and lawmakers have to 
pay attention that the good ends do not justify bad means. 
To be advisable for use in policy decisions a method for measuring and effecting performance 
should meet particular implementation criteria,
10 which are stated as follows: 
(1)  Flexibility in data selection 
To be comparable across disparate programs and organizational units the performance meas-
ure should be independent from the scale level (continuous, ordinal, or categorical) and dif-
ferent units of analysis (monetary, time, scores, rates, quantity units). 
(2)   Robustness for data complexity 
A meaningful evaluation tool has to take into consideration the multidimensional character of 
the performance construct. Performance cannot sufficiently be described by a set of single 
                                                           
9   In the U.S. a performance measurement for the entire public sector is already legally established with the 
Chief Financial Officers Act (CFOA) of 1990, see the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 
1993. For an overview on the state of the U.S. reforms concerning public performance measurement see 
Nyhan and Martin (1999) and also Stirring Committee for the review of commonwealth/state service provi-
sion (1997) for Australia. For an overview on the opportunities and approaches of public performance 
measurement see Nyhan and Marlowe (1995). input-single output-ratios.
11 Otherwise, it may well happen that a provider performs as best 
practice on the one ratio but is inefficient in term of another ratio. If a government agency 
were forced to reduce the number of providers, then which one should be dropped? 
(3)  Competitive view 
Performance measurement should be applied only as relative performance measurement. The 
efficiency value of a particular provider has to be calculated in comparison to the best practice 
player (benchmark), not the average performance. Each provider is judged against all other 
“competitors”. Maximization instead of a satisficing assumption is needed.
12  
(4)  General acceptance and fairness of the methodology 
The measure of performance should be replicable and comprehensible. Therefore, the weights 
for the inputs and outputs should be derived endogenously, i.e., in an objective way and 
should not be influenced by the preferences and personal predispositions of (groups of) poli-
cymakers. In contrast, the need for a priori specification of weights does presumably not lead 
to acceptable and credible benchmarking results, because of the dependence on negotiation 
processes, which are influenced by power and non-pertinent considerations. Assigning deter-
ministic values to each input and output variable upon which all decision makers finally agree 
could be an endless and resource consuming process. 
The best practice provider against a particular unit is benchmarked has to be comparable. 
Only units with a similar input-output-structure should be compared to ensure that the per-
formance evaluation is realistic and focuses not on extreme performance differences but on 
achievable best practice. 
For the evaluation results to be easy to communicate and close to practice the benchmarks 
have to be real existing providers not hypothetical or prescriptive ideals.
13 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
10   For general implementation criteria for scientific models see Leeflang (2000), ch. 7. Data estimation methods    
(e.g., DEA as a nonparametric method) can be understood as measurement models that partly require the 
same “implementation criteria” as economic market models. 
11   See Young (1992). 
12   See Nyhan and Martin (1999). 
13   See Metzger (1993). (5)  Explanatory content  
For a performance measurement method to be theoretically substantial it does not suffice to 
demonstrate that one provider is more successful than another. Beyond that it is necessary to 
explain these differences, i.e., to show the causes of the relative inefficiency.
14 
(6)  Target orientation (comparisons of targets and achievements) 
A relative performance evaluation should not only assess the current efficiency measure but 
also the future performance, which could be achieved. This means, information about the tar-
geted efficiency position are needed. 
(7)  Management orientation 
A relative performance evaluation should not only provide a target performance position but 
also an indication as to how a provider should attempt to vary its inputs and outputs so as to 
achieve a performance comparable to the best observed. Management strategies to improve 
performance may be developed. Output increases and / or input reductions necessary to 
achieve efficiency should be determined. 
However, the ad hoc and theoretically unsound nature of the classic benchmarking technique 
is, as will be argued in the remainder of this paper, somewhat unsatisfactory concerning the 
above stated „implementation criteria“. And even if well suited to give to a service provider 
an indication of his efficiency relative to that of others w. r. t. one particular input and / or 
output it can hardly serve as a basis for negotiations with respect to hospital funding. 
It is argued that a nonparametric method to estimate production frontiers known as Data 
Envelopment Analysis, which can be interpreted as a generalized and systematic form of 
benchmarking, could be used to evaluate the relative performance of public service providers 
and government agencies. By applying it to performance evaluation of German hospitals we 
show that DEA in contrast to simple benchmarking techniques meets the above mentioned 
conditions and thus is advisable as a basis for budgeting, granting, contracting, and other 
resource allocation decisions especially in the field of health care economics. 
DEA is particularly suited for the analysis of technical efficiency of public sector service pro-
vision as no price information for inputs and outputs is needed to determine the degree of technical (in)efficiency in a multiple-input multiple-output setting. The DEA results can form 
the basis of a dynamic regulation scheme, which results in maximum efficiency gains in the 
long run. The method has become an innovative tool to evaluate the performance of hospitals 
and other public services.
15 
DEA is especially suited to benchmark hospitals in Germany according to legal requirements. 
The agreement between hospitals and health insurers on the relative performance evaluation 
of hospitals does call for the benchmarking of the hospital as a whole.
16 The methodology 
agreed upon (for a brief description, see 2.1.3) consists of aggregating individual data and to 
benchmark on this aggregate level. Entire hospitals can be evaluated by DEA in a much more 
transparent way, as will be explained below. 
We will use data on German hospitals that contain the necessary information on the structure 
of the hospitals to ensure that only nearly identical hospitals with respect to their fields of 
specialization, case mix and services provided to patients are compared. In addition, as will be 
demonstrated below, DEA does benchmark only observations with similar input-output 
structure. Thus, the often raised concern that benchmarking results in meaningless compari-
sons does not apply to our benchmarking method. 
The paper is organized in 6 sections. The next section describes some of the benchmarking 
approaches relevant for the methodological discussion about the official benchmarking proce-
dure in Germany. The following section will illustrate the problems of benchmarking using a 
simple example. Next, DEA is introduced as a generalized benchmarking technique. This is 
followed by the presentation of DEA results for German hospitals. A final section briefly dis-
cusses the potential benefits of using DEA over simple benchmarking with respect to the long 
run optimality of the regulation of hospital cost compensation. 
2.  Relative performance evaluation of hospitals in Germany 
After more than a decade of discussion on the issue of relative performance evaluation of hos-
pitals in Germany (Krankenhausbetriebsvergleich) it became evident at the beginning of the 
90’s that German lawmakers were prepared to pass legislation forcing hospitals and insurance 
companies to cooperate on the issue. Hospital managers and owners had strong concerns 
about the fact that insurers had been able to compile ample information on the cost structure 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
14   See Bauer et al. (2000). 
15   For the analysis of hospitals, see Hollingsworth et al. (1999). of all hospitals. Given this, it is obvious why hospitals complain about the asymmetric distri-
bution of information between them and the insurance companies. Efforts were undertaken to 
reduce the asymmetry by generating more information on the relative standing of individual 
hospitals. 
These efforts include the so-called hospital compass devised by führen & wirtschaften im 
Krankenhaus (f&w), a periodical on hospital management.
17 Consultants also devised hospital 
benchmarks (Henke / Paffrath / Wettke) with data they had compiled.
18 The Wissen-
schaftliches Institut der Ortskrankenkassen (WIdO), the research institute run by the largest 
German health insurer, Allgemeine Ortskrankenkasse (AOK), set up its own procedure to 
benchmark hospitals. These three benchmarking approaches will be briefly described and dis-
cussed. 
In addition to these, a number of other relative performance evaluation schemes are in opera-
tion. Best known are the Echolot by an independent consultant
19, as well as a survey approach 
used in a study published in Focus magazine.
20 
2.1.  Approach of Henke/Paffrath/Wettke (1995) 
This study discusses many potential benchmarking strategies for hospital performance. One of 
the examples based on German data in Henke et al. (1995) is a comparison of case cost for 
several ICDs across different cities in Germany. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
16   See Deutsche Krankenhausgesellschaft (1999). 
17   See Meurer (1995). 
18   See Henke et al. (1995).   
19   See Kaufmann and Wolf (1998). 
20   These benchmarks are contained in Hildebrandt (1996). Figure 1:  
Differences in case cost across German cities
21 
 
The findings (see Figure 1) include a 53% difference for average case cost between one 
German city and the nation wide average. The authors claim that this “dramatic difference in 
productivity” is due to allocative and technical inefficiency. Furthermore, the authors 
maintain that differences between cities are not due to differences in case mix, which they 
hold can be accounted for by a weighting scheme (Wichtungsfaktoren). The data are weighted 
by patients’ age and sex. The weighting scheme itself is not described nor is there an 
indication as to how the results derived by simple benchmarking were affected by the 
weighting scheme applied to them.
22 
2.2.  f&w hospital compass 
The second approach described here is the result of benchmarking program initiated by f&w. 
Participating hospitals are offered a relative performance evaluation of their data vis-à-vis 
other participating hospitals. In addition to benchmarks on average personnel cost and length 
of a stay, special indicators, e.g. for laboratory services, are surveyed from time to time. 
Between 200 and 300 hospitals take part in the hospital compass. The hospitals are divided 
into nine groups according to the scheme presented in Table 1. 
                                                           
21   Figure 1 reproduces graph 14-10 from Henke et al. (1995), p. 203. 
22   See Henke et al. (1995), p. 206. Table 1:  
f&w hospital compass, grouping scheme
23 
Group  1  2  3  4  5 6 7  8 
No. of beds  -200  200+  201- 400 201- 400 401-600 401-600  601 - 800  800+
No. of fields  - 3  3+  - 6 6+ - 8 8+   
 
Each hospital is provided with information on the mean and the distribution of the relevant 
parameters within its group. 
2.3.  Approach of Wissenschaftliches Institut der Ortskrankenkassen 
(WIdO) 
The final benchmarking methodology outlined here is the official hospital program of the 
“Krankenhausbetriebsvergleich” carried out by the WIdO.
 The WIdO collects data, which hos-
pitals are required to provide on their number and type of cases treated and the respective 
cost.
24 These data are more exhaustive than any other German data. They comprise more than 
2000 hospitals. 
The data are used to form groups of hospitals with similar case mix. The (dis)similarity of 
case mixes is measured by calculating the differences between the shares, which the leading 
ICDs have among the referrals to the hospitals. The homogeneity of the groups formed by 
means of the ICD-criterion is then estimated using cluster analysis (see Table 2). Homogene-
ity refers to the shares of the ICDs but not to the departmental or hospital structure. It is 
claimed that large and small departments may be compared in this way. The individual 
departments are benchmarked against the mean of the per diem and case cost of their respec-
tive groups. Also, these data are aggregated to derive a benchmark for the entire hospital. 
2.4.  Benchmark selection and comparability 
Some aspects of the approaches described above merit further discussion. All three ap-
proaches use different criteria to judge whether hospitals can be compared in a meaningful 
way and thus can be benchmarked via the same reference units. Henke et al. (1995) consider 
                                                           
23   The entries in the Table read: -x „up to x“ and x+ „more than x“. 
24   See Deutsche Krankenhausgesellschaft (1999). all hospitals, which treat the same ICD as potential benchmarks for each other. According to 
these authors, existing differences can be handled by “weighting”. In f&w, hospitals of similar 
size and structure are benchmarked without further weighting. WIdO does benchmark hospi-
tals, which treat a similar mix of cases. 
Instead of searching for exogenous indicators of similarity, which only can be incomplete it 
would be more appropriate to compare units with a similar input-output-structure, which is a 
direct measure of comparability. All relevant differences in hospital structure will be reflected 
in a specific input-output-structure. With DEA, the comparability is determined endogenously 
when calculating the relative efficiency score and no need for exogenous specification of 
similarity exists. The clustering of several groups of homogenous hospitals is achieved by the 
DEA method itself in a direct and transparent way as opposed to e.g., cluster analysis, a sta-
tistical technique designed to generate segments of maximum intra segment homogeneity and 
inter segment heterogeneity. Cluster analysis will not yield specific hospitals as benchmarks 
and allows only comparisons of single observations with segment means.
25 
In all three procedures benchmarks are selected which are not observed values but rather 
group means calculated from groups with possibly high intra-group heterogeneity. It is not 
clear if these group means are relevant for all hospitals in the group as a benchmark. Even if 
the group is homogeneous, taking means as benchmarks will render benchmarking partly 
meaningless. A mean is not produced by any single hospital, therefore an inefficient hospital 
will not be provided with a role model to guide its own choices. This, however, is one of the 
main advantages of benchmarking. 
Second, and more importantly, a mean does not describe Best Practice. Therefore, even if all 
hospitals with below average performance (performance less than the mean) will improve 
their performance to match mean performance, potentially large efficiency gains – the differ-
ence between mean and best practice - will not be realized because convergence of common 
practice to Best Practice, although theoretically possible, will be achieved at a very slow rate. 
Also, the use of weighting procedures will make benchmarking result hard to interpret if not 
unintelligible. A hospital ranked somewhere in the mid field will have to “re-engineer” its 
benchmarking results to find out why its performance is rated average, i.e. how the weights 
influenced the ranking. This destroys some of the advantages of the clear-cut information 
benchmarking ordinarily provides. 
                                                           
25   The WIdO uses this method as a means of hospital benchmarking, see Gerste (1996). Finally, standard benchmarking is an informative but nevertheless ad hoc procedure, which 
has no theoretical foundations. It is obvious that if one wants to proceed from detecting dif-
ferences in the performance of hospitals to regulating hospitals such that efficient perform-
ance is rewarded and inefficiency is discouraged, it will be of advantage to apply a method 
which is strongly rooted in economic theory. 
In the sequel, we will describe a methodology which benchmarks comparable units using ob-
served (not mean) performance. Special emphasis will be put on the comparison of standard 
benchmarking techniques and DEA in order to make the advantages and disadvantages of the 
two approaches transparent. 
3.  Benchmarking vs. DEA 
3.1.  Some problems with standard benchmarking 
In the sequel, an extensive treatment of DEA will be given such that the implications of the 
results presented should be easily understood. Further material on DEA can be found in the 
relevant literature.
26 The focus of this subsection are the advantages of DEA vis-à-vis bench-
marking which make DEA advisable for policymakers and administrative decision makers as 
an adequate tool for relative performance evaluation. The following simple example will 
demonstrate that while DEA retains the two most desirable characteristics of standard bench-
marking - best practice evaluation and comparison with observed as opposed to hypothetical 
practice - it does not have the above-mentioned undesirable features while it fulfills the 
implementation criteria. 
The panel of graph 1 below illustrates the difficulties when benchmarking on more than one 
criterion. This is especially relevant for the German situation where a global hospital bench-
mark consisting of several (weighted) sub-benchmarks is required. The example will serve as 
a demonstration of what is possible with DEA but not with standard benchmarking. The two 
benchmarking criteria selected are case cost and length of stay. Of course, with a per diem the 
two parameters will both move in the same direction. However, there may as well exist a pos-
sibility substitution between time and money. For instance, minimal invasive surgery may be 
more expensive but will make shorter stays in the hospital possible. 
                                                           
26   See for example Charnes et al. (1997). Inspecting the part (a) in Figure 2 it would be hard to justify any ranking of the hospitals A, B 
and C. No single hospital dominates any other on both criteria. With standard benchmarking, 
the ranking would therefore depend completely on the relative weight assigned to the two 
parameters. The more weight is put on case cost, the better hospital C will be ranked; the 
more weight is put on length of stay, the better will hospital A’s performance be ranked. Thus 
with simple benchmarking approaches (simple ratio analysis) the results can be manipulated 
by a specific and more or less arbitrary set of weights. A benchmark, which is chosen in this 
particular way, can hardly be a transparent and thus a defensible performance standard. 
Part (b) illustrates a possibility to simultaneously benchmark the two criteria. Shifting the 
graph on length of stay from (a) by 90° and moving it into the case cost graph will produce 
the isoquant on the two inputs used to treat a case: time and money. The three hospitals A, B 
and C, none of which dominates any of the others are all located on the isoquant (efficiency 
frontier) and are therefore viewed as efficient producers. The lower panel (c) shows the same 
three hospitals plus hospitals D and E. The latter two lie above the isoquant in (d) and are 
therefore rated as inefficient producers. Also, it becomes evident that so-called “ideal points” 
of performance often proposed in benchmarking studies may not be feasible given current 
technology. Figure 2:  













  (c)  Augmented  example      (d) Determination of efficiency 
The degree of efficiency can easily be calculated, see figure (d) constructed in analogous fash-
ion from figure (c) as figure (b) from figure (a). The simplest case is that of hospital E, which 
is completely dominated in its performance by hospital B. The latter has lower case cost and 
shorter length of stay. In the case of hospital E, being dominated by hospital B, efficiency is 
calculated as follows: the closer any input combination for a given output is to the origin, the 
more efficient is the production of this output. Consequently, one may compare the relative 
efficiency of the two producers or hospitals by comparing the distance of their input combina-
tions to the origin. In the case of hospitals B and E, this relative efficiency is calculated as the 
ratio of the two distances, i.e.  /. OB OE  
Note that this is the maximum efficiency, which can be ascribed to hospital E given its combi-
nation of inputs. Point B is the input combination observed, which is closest to E. Therefore, 
the efficiency of E would be lower if benchmarked relative to any other reference point, e.g., 
the “ideal” reference point mentioned above. 
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VFor hospital D efficiency is measured by the ratio of the distance from the origin to point D 
and the distance between the origin and the point on the isoquant next to D, i.e., the point on 
the isoquant crossed by the line between the origin and D. For inefficient producers, the effi-
ciency measure will therefore always be strictly smaller than 1, for efficient producers it will 
always be equal to 1. The efficiency of D will be equal to 00 VD . Farrell (1957) has pro-
posed this ratio of distances as a measure of efficiency. It corresponds to Shepard’s distance 
developed in Shepard (1970). Thus, this way of “benchmarking” productive efficiency is 
firmly based on microeconomics production theory. We will develop DEA in a formal way in 
the next section. 
3.2.  DEA-related techniques 
DEA is similar to econometric techniques that estimate production frontier functions, i.e., to 
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA).
27 Estimating the production function underlying the 
observed combinations of inputs and outputs DEA aims at the same goal as SFA. It does so 
by evaluating the efficiency of each producer or, in DEA parlance, decision-making unit 
(DMU) through comparison of its set of inputs and outputs to that of any other producer. 
Instead of deriving a hypothetical production frontier a comparison with observed best prac-
tice determines whether a producer is rated efficient or not. This makes it similar to bench-
marking and in fact, DEA can be interpreted as a generalization of simple benchmarking 
techniques. 
3.3.  Illustration of the basic principles 
In the single-input single-output case, DEA is very similar to benchmarking. However, DEA 
is capable of handling multiple-input multiple-output situations systematically. It is also capa-
ble of generating useful information on how to improve on the efficiency position of an ineffi-
cient hospital. For instance, with standard benchmarking one would be unable to compare 
hospitals that take different approaches to handling certain cases. If there is a choice between 
conservative treatment, surgery and minimal invasive surgery (as might be the case for the 
rupture of a ligament) different hospitals might prefer different forms of treatment. The con-
servative alternative may be the cheapest but may also take the longest whereas minimal inva-
sive surgery will be the most expensive but will also make very short stays possible. Standard 
surgery will be in between the two extremes. Instead of applying the same vector of weights to the parameters for all hospitals, as would be 
the case with standard benchmarking, DEA assigns an individual, mathematically optimal 
vector of weights to each hospital in a way that maximum weights are placed on those vari-
ables where a provider compares favorably and minimum weights are placed on those vari-
ables where it compares unfavorably. Below, input weights are denoted vi and output weights 
ur with index i for inputs and index r for outputs whereas index j runs over the hospitals. The 
sum of these weighted output-to-input-ratios, h, is then maximized under the restriction that 
no other hospital achieves a score greater than 1 (or any other number chosen for normaliza-
tion) with the weights that maximize the index of the hospital that is being evaluated. This 
results in the following expression:
28 The figure for the hospital -or more generally DMU- 





rr rr j rr
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                                              (1) 
The formulation of the problem makes clear that the weights underlying the comparison 
between DMU0 and the other DMUs maximize the efficiency of DMU0. Comparatively high 
y´s therefore will carry high u´s, high x´s on the other hand will have low v´s.  
Proceeding in this way, all three hospitals in the example would be rated efficient. The hospi-
tal using minimal invasive surgery (hospital A) would be assigned high weights vl for the 
parameter length of stay and a low weight vc would be assigned to its high input (cost). The 
hospital preferring the conservative approach (hospital C) would be assigned a low vl to 
length of stay and a high vc to its low cost. Each hospital is considered efficient in its own 
way. All hospitals would then be part of the efficient production frontier. In standard bench-
marking, as stated above, only one hospital would be rated efficient or different hospitals 
would be rated efficient by different criteria. 
One would be unable to observe which hospitals employ surgeons are capable of performing 
minimal invasive surgery. Therefore, it makes sense to allow for several alternative input-out-
put-combinations to be rated efficient. Using DEA, it does not really matter for the efficiency 
position of the hospital whether or not its surgeons are capable of one particular technique as 
long as they employ their method of treatment in an efficient way and as long as this method 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
27   For a comprehensive treatment of both methodological approaches, see Coelli et al. (1998). 
28   See Charnes et al. (1997). is not completely dominated (slower and more expensive) by other available techniques. The 
use of such dominated techniques would correctly be interpreted as a sign of inefficiency. 
3.4.  Formal description 
Continuing the formal discussion of DEA, the optimization problem (1) can be transformed 
into a common linear programming problem by a change of variables. The problem on the 
right of formula (2) below (in vector notation) corresponds to equations (1) above
29 and the 
primal program on the left is the input oriented formulation of the same problem. Here, effi-
ciency is measured as the maximum input reduction possible for an inefficient producer if he 





The parameters µ and ν are the analogues of the weights u and v in the ratio formulation and ε 
is a non-archimedian.
30 The interpretation of µ and ν is that of prices on which the optimiza-
tion of DMU0 with respect to its inputs and outputs would have been based. In the input-ori-
ented formulation on the left, the slacks for output and input are labeled s
+ and s
-, respec-
tively, and an efficient peer unit enters the reference technology for DMU0 with a factor λ. 
In case a DMU is efficient, its reference technology is its own input-output-combination and 
we have λ = 1. For an inefficient DMU, some λ-weighted average of efficient DMUs will be 
able to produce at least as much output ( 0 YsY λ
+ − = ) using only a fraction θ of its inputs 
( 0 0 XXs θλ
− −− = ). The score θ indicates by which common factor all inputs could be 
reduced if an efficient production technology was used. The formulation above on the left is 
the one on which the results to be presented are based. 
                                                           
29  Formula (1) is a constant returns to scale formulation that was chosen to illustrate the similarity to bench-
marking whereas (2) represents a variable returns to scale formulation that will be used in the analysis. 
30   In principle, the solution depends on the value of ε, usually chosen between 10
-4 and 10
-6 but the issue is of 
little practical relevance (see Olesen and Petersen, 1994). A two-stage algorithm determining first the effi-
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      (2) Furthermore, the results of a DEA consist of the slacks as well as the corresponding virtual 
multipliers or shadow prices from the solution of the dual problem. Slacks indicate that inputs 
would have to be reduced by more than (1 - θ) to match the input use of the reference hospital 
and that the outputs of the reference technology exceed those of DMU0, respectively. Thus, 
DEA also gives directions on how to improve the efficiency of any DMU. 
3.5.  Extensions 
DEA can also allow for parameters, which are important in determining efficiency but cannot 
be controlled (at least not in the short run) by the DMU. This makes the comparison of 
DMUs, which face different environmental settings, possible. Standard benchmarking tech-
niques would necessitate “weighting” and thus give results, which are not readily interpret-
able. 
In the case of German hospitals, a non-controllable parameter would be the number of beds. 
An authority of the federal state the hospital is located in determines the size of the hospital. 
The extension of DEA allowing for the use of non-discretionary indicator variables is devel-
oped in Banker and Morey (1986).
31 These non-discretionary parameters enter the optimiza-
tion but do not directly determine the efficiency score, θ. This alters the formulation of the left 






                                           (3) 
 
Efficiency is now defined by the maximum input reduction possible with respect to the pa-
rameters under the control of the DMU, XD. The non-discretionary parameters XI do enter the 
optimization indirectly such that no reference technology is allowed to have higher inputs 
                                                           
31   See Ruggiero (1996) and Staat (1999) for recent discussions on the topic of non-discretionary variables. 
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 than XI0. They do not play a role in calculating θ  other than restricting the reference tech-
nology. 
4.  Data 
The data on German hospitals that will be analyzed are taken from the 1995 and 1996 issues 
of the Krankenhaus-Report. All data on hospitals refer to the years 1994/95, i.e., before the 
current system of financing hospitals was introduced. Individual hospitals are not anonymous 
but can be identified, i.e., name, location etc. are known. More than 2000 hospitals are con-
tained in the 1994 raw data set and some 1800 in the 1995 data, 1700 hospitals were con-
tained in both data sets. 
The information
32 available for the 1700 hospitals includes type of ownership (public, private 
or a non-profit), size (number of beds), structure of the hospital (number and type of depart-
ments) and the per diem. Unfortunately, the per diem is available only for the entire hospital 
and not for the individual departments. The per diem indicates the cost of the provision of a 
bed for a day by a specific hospital. This cost will vary with the structure and the facilities of 
a hospital. Therefore, to make our analysis meaningful, it is important to ensure that only hos-
pitals with a very similar structure and very similar facilities are compared. 
Hospitals with (nearly) identical departmental structures are grouped into one of 77 different 
structure classes. They are also grouped in four classes according to their function in the Ger-
man health system: hospitals of only local importance providing basic care without any large 
scale technical facilities (type I), basic care hospitals with some technical facilities that are of 
regional importance (type II), hospitals with various departments which are of central impor-
tance for the region (type III) and hospitals with a maximum of facilities (type IV).
33 Type I, 
local, and type II, regional, hospitals are relevant for this analysis. 
The average length of stay is known for each of the following five departments: internal medi-
cine, surgery, gynecology, orthopedics and ENT. In addition, the hospital data are subdivided 
in clusters according to the case mix of their referrals. 
The available information is used in the following way: To ensure that only hospitals that are 
absolutely comparable are contained in the data we restrict the analysis to 3 out of the 77 
                                                           
32   For a full description see Arnold and Paffrath (1995), p. 273 ff. and Arnold and Paffrath (1996), p. 279 ff. 
33   Definitions taken from Steinmetz (1991), p. 41 f. and translated by the authors. structural groups (numbers 11 to 13)
34. These are hospitals that provide basic care and have 
two main departments: one for internal medicine and one for surgery. The only difference 
between the three groups is that the fraction of patients who are treated by external specialists 
differs.
35 The hospitals are either of type I (local) or of type II (regional); therefore, the data 
are split into two sets. This leaves 160 hospitals, 108 of type I and 52 of type II. 
The indicators used to compare these hospitals are the per diem
36 and number of beds as 
inputs. As the number of beds cannot be changed in the very short run it is treated as a non-
discretionary variable. 
Output is modeled by number of cases processed per year and average speed of treatment in 
the two fields of specialization.
37 The speed of treatment measure is calculated as one over 
average length of stay in each of the two departments. If capacity use were at 100% the two 
indicators would be redundant given the size of the hospital. But average capacity use in hos-
pitals is well below 100%.
38 
To control for differences in case mix we classify hospitals according to the fraction of differ-
ent leading (three digit) ICDs in each department. Surgery divisions are subdivided in 6 case 
mix clusters (see Table 2).
39 The only criterion by which one of the clusters differs substan-
tially from the others is intensive care days per 100 cases.
40 The cluster with the most hetero-
geneous case mix (code 99) has about twice as many intensive care days (59.1) as classes 1 to 
5 (between 22.6 and 33.1 days). This is reflected in the comments made by Gerste: "Although 
the hospitals treat different case mixes there is no difference in the services they provide. ... 
Only the heterogeneous classes with their high values for intensive care stand out".
41 
For the internal medicine department again only the heterogeneous group that has an average 
patient stay of 16.1 days stands out from the other three groups where length of stay ranges 
                                                           
34   See Arnold and Paffrath (1995), p. 274. 
35   The fraction is below 10% for group 11, between 10% and 20% for group 12 and over 20% for group 13. 
36   Average treatment cost is also available. To check the robustness of the results, the analysis that follows was 
carried out with this cost measure. There were only slight differences between the two data definitions as far 
as the results on efficiency are concerned. 
37   Cases per year are only listed in intervals of 1000 cases, which may create some imprecision. We therefore 
used an alternative measure calculated as number of beds times days per year times average capacity use (see 
Table A 2 in the appendix) and reran the analysis to check the robustness of the results. No significant 
between the two models were detected and the subsequent analysis was carried out using the number of cases 
listed. 
38   See Table A 2 in the appendix. 
39  See also Gerste (1996), chap. 11.2 as well as Arnold and Paffrath (1996), p. 281 for a description of the 
distribution of ICD over case mix clusters. 
40   See Table 11-3 in Gerste (1996), p. 123. between 12.9 and 13.8 days.
42 For each department a dummy for adverse case mix is set to 
one if the hospital treats a heterogeneous case mix. 
Table 2:  
Characteristics of case mix clusters 
Department / ICD-Cluster  Code Length of stayin days Intensive care days in 100 cases
Surgery 
Inner knee-joint  1 10.6 22.6
No leading ICD.  2 11.2 30.0
Hernia; cholelithiasis  3 11.3 28.1
Arteriosclerosis; varicose veins  4 11.4 33.1
Commotion; appendicitis  5 11.2 28.6
Rest 99 10.8 59.1
Internal medicine 
Low fraction of common ICDs  1 13.8  41.7 
No leading ICD  2 13.5 42.4
Chronic heart disease (ICD 414)  3 12.9 39.0
Rest 99 16.1 39.9
As mentioned above, the hospitals may admit patients who are treated by external specialists, 
for instance an ophthalmologist or an urologist. This does not affect the measure of length of 
patient stay of, say patients of the surgery ward of the hospital, directly but may complicate 
hospital management in general. To take this into account, an indicator consisting of the num-
ber of all fields of specialization including those represented by external specialists is 
included. 
The set of two input and five output indicators is used to assess the efficiency of the hospitals. 
Table 3 contains some summary statistics of the data. The fact the hospitals of regional impor-
tance are slightly larger than the ones of local relevance is reflected in their higher figure for 
maximum number of beds and cases treated. Hospitals of regional importance have slightly 
more fields of specialization than only locally relevant hospitals. All other indicators have 
very much the same range with the exception of average length of stay in the surgery depart-
ment, which takes a maximum of three weeks in the local and of only two weeks in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
41   Gerste (1996), p. 123, translated by the authors. regional hospitals. The difference in average lengths of stays is not statistically significant, 
however. Treatment duration is longer for the internal medicine departments and shorter for 
the surgery departments of the type I hospitals when compared to the hospitals of type II. A 
significant difference for the means of the dummy variables for adverse case mix indicates a 
more heterogeneous case mix which surgery departments in regionally important hospitals 





















                                                                                                                                                                                     
42   Data kindly provided by B. Gerste, WIdO.  
Table 3:  
Summary statistics 
 variable  mean s.  d. min  max
per diem  393.61 51.67 260.56  574.76
avg. cost per case  4736 844 3500  8000
number of beds  162 44 70  265
cases treated p. a.   4907 1531 2000  8000
avg. length of stay  11.39 1.86 7.5  18.4
avg. length internal med. dept.  12.39 1.95 7.3  19.1
avg. length surgery dept.  10.83 2.22 6.6  21.1
adverse case mix internal med.  .019 .14 0  1
adverse case mix surgery  .046 .211 0  1
Local  
hospitals 
total no. of fields of specialization  3.71 1.15 2  8
per diem  389.77 50.58 310.39  581.75
avg. cost per case  4606 1063 3000  10000
Number of beds  196 73 50  441
cases treated p. a.   6192  2368 2000  14000
avg. length of stay  11.26 1.80 7.9  20.5
avg. length internal med. dept.  11.89 2.01 7.8  16.5
avg. length surgery dept.  11.13 1.66 7.7  15.6
Adverse case mix internal med.  .0577 .24 0  1
Adverse case mix surgery  .212 .417 0  1
Regional  
hospitals 
total no. of fields of specialization  4.19 1.192 2  7
Only very few hospitals face an adverse case mix of patients. This reflects the fact that the 
hospitals in the data belong to the segment of the hospital system that provides the most basic 
form of clinical care. Cases that are viewed as very complex or unclear are mostly referred to 
more advanced (type I or type II hospitals with a broader range of departments or type III or 
IV) hospitals. Only among the surgery departments of the type II hospitals (see appendix, 
Table A 1) are there nearly 20% observations with an adverse case mix. For the hospitals 
handling an adverse case mix, per diem is higher (though not statistically significant) than for 
the other hospitals whereas average length of stay is the same for both. 5.  Results 
5.1.  Efficiency distribution in the hospital samples 
Table 4 below shows a summary of the efficiency scores of the hospitals analyzed. There are 
28 efficient hospitals among the 108 type I hospitals; 18 type I hospitals have an efficiency 
below 75%. Average or structural efficiency is 86% for type I and 89 % for type II (regional) 
hospitals. A higher fraction of the latter (about a third) is efficient. Eight type II hospitals have 
an efficiency rating below 75%. The results are very much in line with results found by previ-
ous DEA studies on hospitals.
43 
Because of the fact that the cost information available is not too detailed, there would be some 
cause for concern if the hospitals analyzed were not homogeneous enough to be comparable. 
Then, some hospitals may be rated systematically as (in)efficient simply because they are not 
truly comparable with the rest of the data in the sample. Table A 3 in the appendix gives no 
evidence that the data consist of a heterogeneous mixture of hospitals. 
Table 4:  
Efficiency scores 
 observed θ = 1 mean s.d. θ  < 75%  min max
type I hospital  108 28 .86 .1256 18  .48  1
type II hospital  52 17 .89 .1175 8  .58  1
 
The efficient and the inefficient hospitals appear to be strikingly similar. Average per diem 
differs by less than 20 DM, number of beds is smaller for efficient type I hospitals and larger 
for efficient type II hospitals than for the respective inefficient counterparts. Average length 
of stay in the internal medicine department is even longer for efficient type II hospitals than 
for inefficient ones. 
Thus, there is no single parameter that makes efficient hospitals stand out from the rest; rather 
it is a combination of inputs and outputs similar to inefficient hospitals that nevertheless can-
not be matched by other hospitals, which makes a hospital efficient. There is no way to assure 
                                                           
43   See Hollingsworth et al. (1998). Byrnes and Valdmanis (1997) evaluat 123 hospitals and find 6 hospitals to 
be efficient with an average efficiency of 61%. The lowest pure technical efficiency
 in their sample was 48%. that hospitals, which are efficient in this way, will be identified by any (weighted) standard 
benchmarking technique. It is interesting to note that a benchmarking technique placing a 
high weight on length of stay in the medicine department would result in a bad rating to effi-
cient type II hospitals. 
The three structure groups also do not seem to be play a role in explaining the differences in 
productivity among the hospitals analyzed as can be seen by inspection of Table 5. 
Table 5:  
Efficiency distribution over structure groups 
 inefficient  efficient  Total 
structure group  number (rel. freq.)  number (rel. freq.)  number 
11  32    (76.19%) 10   (23.81%) 42
12  52    (73.24%) 19   (26.76%) 71
13  30    (63.83%) 17   (36.17%) 47
Total  114   (71.25%) 46   (28.75%) 160
Table 6 reveals the influence of the type ownership on efficiency. One can conclude that the 
hospitals run by non-profit organizations are managed less efficiently than other hospitals. 
Table 6:  
Efficiency by type of ownership 
type of ownership  inefficient  efficient  total 
  number   rel. freq  number   rel. freq  number  
non-profit  58    81.69% 13    18.31%  71
Private  3    60.00% 2    40.00%  5
Public  53    63.10% 31    36.90%  84
Total 114    46      1605.2.  Results for individual hospitals 
The following paragraphs provide an example of how the degree of inefficiency of an individ-
ual hospital is determined by DEA. 
5.2.1.  Efficient hospitals 
The first three efficient hospitals (code K77, K110, K148) contained in Table 7 are the ones 
dominating the hospital K88. Hospital K148 is a smaller type I hospital of local importance 
with a very low per diem. Length of stay is well below average in both departments, it has one 
additional field of specialization and the number of cases it treats is in line with the cases 
calculated as described above. Its low cost and short patient stays make it efficient. Hospitals 
K110 differs from hospital K148 in that it only has average length of stay for its internal 
medicine patients and above average for its surgery patients but the minimum per diem 
observed in these data which is what makes it efficient. It is smaller than hospital K148. Hos-
pital K77, on the other hand, achieves efficiency by generating close to maximum output with 
respect to cases and fields of specialization. The patient stays in this hospital, however, are 
longer than average. Table 7:  
Efficient peers and inefficient hospitals 
  type I hospitals  type II hospitals 
 efficient  inefficient  efficient  inefficient 
Code K77 K110 K148 K88 K125  K4
per diem  334.34 260.6 294.6 349.9 342.2  393.9
treatment flat rate  4500 3500 3500 4000 4000  4500
number of beds  262 80 105 158 200  210
number of cases  8000 2000 4000 5000 6000  6000
calculated number cases  6140 1730 3400  4503 7400  5894
avg. stay internal  13.9 12.4 9.3 11.5  10.6  11.9
avg. stay surgery  12.5 15.5 7.8 10.5 8.2  9.7
adverse case mix med. Dept.  - - - - - 
adverse case mix surgery dept.  - - - - adv. 
number of specialisation fields   6 3 3 4 4  4
θ  1 1 1 .86 1 .87
ownership non-profit public public non-profit public  non-profit
structure group  13 11 12 12 13  11
Hospital K125 is an efficient hospital of the regional type, which differs from other efficient 
hospitals in that it faces an adverse case mix among its surgery patients. It combines relatively 
low cost with below average lengths of stay. 
Table 8:  
Virtual multipliers for inefficient hospitals
44 
        treatment speed  adverse case mix   
code  per diem beds    cases  internal  surgery  internal   surgery  nr. fields 
K88 -2.86    .03 .46  .25  
K4 -2.54    .16  .08
 
Three of the efficient hospitals listed are owned by public institutions, one by a non-profit 
institution. With one exception, they are like most of the hospitals analyzed here located in 
                                                           
44   Per diem was divided by 100 when calculating the efficiency scores. The virtual multipliers have to be inter-
preted accordingly. A 10 DM reduction in per diem would mean a 25% increase in efficiency. The number of 
beds was also divided by 100, cases were divided by 1000. communities with a population of 20.000 or less. The inefficient hospitals, on the other hand, 
are all owned by non-profit organizations and are located in communities of similar size. 
5.2.2.  Inefficient hospitals 
It would be interesting to know how the inefficient hospitals can move away from their ineffi-
cient position. The efficiency scores and the weights, which indicate the relevance of an effi-
cient peer for a certain reference technology, give an indication of the degree of inefficiency 
of a hospital and therefore indicate potential cost savings. The virtual multipliers which are 
also part of the DEA results, on the other hand, show whether changes of parameters in the 
appropriate direction will lead to an immediate improvement in efficiency –when multipliers 
are non-zero- or whether small changes in parameters values will lead to no immediate effect 
–when multipliers a equal to zero. Thus, the question what influences the efficiency position 
of an inefficient (in fact, any) DMU is best answered by looking at the virtual multipliers. 
Hospital K88 was included in Table 7 and Table 8 as a typical inefficient type I hospital. It 
could reduce its inputs by 14% (which is about average) were it to produce with the technol-
ogy of the virtual reference hospital. Its reference technology consists of hospitals K77, K110 
and K148 where the set of weights for this virtual DMU is λ88 = {.37, .24, .39}. 
The set of virtual multipliers is listed in Table 8. The non-zero multipliers indicate that K88 
could change the parameter marginally to change the efficiency position. For instance, its 
surgery department is relatively efficient according to the length of stay criterion. The current 
virtual DMU could not dominate K88 with the same set of weights were this parameter to be 
improved slightly. Hence, θ88 would change if its average stay in its surgery department could 
be shortened. Treating more cases would also improve the efficiency of K88. 
An interesting special case is type II hospital K4. It is, as can be seen comparing the data in 
Table 7, completely dominated by K125. 
5.3.  Calculation of the savings potential 
Having made transparent how the results were derived and how individual hospitals can inter-
pret the findings with respect to their efficiency position the efficiency scores are now used to 
calculate possible savings for the class of hospitals analyzed. One has to remember that the 
efficiency score is the input contraction (cost reduction), possible if an inefficient hospital 
applies an efficient production technology. Therefore, efficiency score times cost gives effi-cient cost. Since the per diem was used as a cost indicator in the analysis total hospital cost 
are now calculated as per diem times average length of stay times cases. Individual hospital 
cost is multiplied with the efficiency score to give efficient cost. Summing over all hospitals, 
efficient cost are only 83% of current total cost for the type I hospitals. For the type II hospi-
tals, the ratio of efficient to current cost is 92%. 
6.  Conclusions 
The main finding of the study is that according to 1994/95 data significant productivity differ-
ences between very similar hospitals exist. The most inefficient hospitals could half their cost 
by applying an efficient technology.  
The average productivity was found to be 86% for the smaller (type I) hospitals and cost 
savings calculated on this basis amounted to 17% of total hospital cost. This is well in line 
with other DEA studies on relative hospital efficiency. 
Ownership seems to play a role for the efficiency of a hospital, as the hospitals run by non-
profit organizations seem to be less efficient than other hospitals. 
Once the results have been derived there is one particular advantage in comparison with fig-
ures established through simple benchmarking. The DEA results can be used to evaluate the 
present reimbursement system for hospitals against an optimal regulation system. An optimal 
regulation under asymmetric information can by based on DEA results using the concept of 
yardstick competition. A regulation scheme based on the concept of yardstick competition in 
conjunction with DEA has been described and successfully implemented before, for the 
regulation of service providers.
45 
Hence the main advantages of DEA over the current system of relative performance evalua-
tion of hospitals in Germany can be summed up as follows: DEA provides systematic instead 
of ad hoc evaluation, is able to evaluate entire hospitals based on disaggregated data, is thus 
transparent an is firmly based on production theory. 
                                                           
45   See Bogetoft (1997). References 
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Table A 1: Hospitals with normal and adverse case mix 
   per diem  avg. stay 
surgery department    mean (s. d.)  mean (s. d.) 
type I hospitals  normal   (103) 392.63  (52.62)  10.84 (2.24)
  adverse     (5) 413.97  (16.36)  10.58 (1.90)
type II hospitals  normal    (41) 384.69  (44.50)  11.09 (1.47)
  adverse    (11) 408.68  (68.01)  11.27 (2.35)
internal medicine department   
type I hospitals  normal   (106) 393.77  (52.13)  12.45 (1.90)
  adverse     (2) 385.12  (15.05)  9.15 (2.05)
type II hospitals  normal    (49) 386.7   (43.62)  12.07 (1.92)
  adverse     (3) 439.87 (124.82)  9.03 (1.47)
 
Table A 2: Capacity use by federal state in 1993
46 
Federal state    Federal state   
Baden-Wuerttemberg .826  Hessen  .825 
Bayern   Mecklenburg-Vorpommern  .789 
Berlin .867  Niedersachsen .814 
Brandenburg .777  Nordrhein-Westfalen .819 
Bremen .811  Rheinland-Pfalz .827 







                                                           
46   See Table 17-11 in Reister (1995). Table A 3: Inefficient and efficient hospitals: Summary statistics 
  Type I hospitals  Type II hospitals 
variable inefficient  efficient  inefficient  efficient 
per diem  396.95 381.27  397.36  380.19
treatment flat rate  4882.35 4195.65  4948.27  4173.91
beds 165 154  192  201
avg. stay internal medicine department  12.60 11.60  11.27  11.41
avg. stay surgery department  10.94 10.39  11.45  10.71
adv. case mix internal medicine department  0 .09  0  .13
adv. case mix surgery department  .01 .17  .24  .17
number of fields of specialisation  3.61 4.09  3.97  4.48
observations 85 23  29  23
 